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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to determine what factors
may have contributed to the poor performance of festival
markets. To understand the possible pitfalls of this
redevelopment tool, we examined Richmond's 6th Street
Marketplace, the first festival market to experience so dismal
a performance that the city asked developer James Rouse to
leave as equity partner and manager.
The Richmond experience evidenced that strong local
leadership was sufficient to build and finance the marketplace
but not enough to sustain it. Festival markets were still
untested at the time 6th Street was planned. Rouse was
unaware of the demographic requirements of the market's
customer base. Nor did he know what scale of project could be
successful. Captured by the idea of building a bridge between
the black and white communities, Rouse constructed an
inefficient and inflexible building and was unable to adjust
to the customer profile attracted to this location. The site
selected provided few amenities to complement the marketplace
and presented economic and psychological barriers to potential
visitors. An alternative site offered greater amenities and
competed with the marketplace for food, entertainment and
specialty item customers. The marketplace did succeed in
keeping two major department stores in the city. It also
improved the image of downtown Richmond. However, the burden
of providing ongoing financial support for the facility offset
this benefit.
Thesis Supervisor: Bernard J. Frieden
Title: Professor of City Planning
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INTRODUCTION
Few innovations in urban planning and development have
generated as much enthusiasm as festival marketplaces. In the
mid-1980's every mayor envisioned revitalizing his moribund
downtown or replacing his rat-infested waterfront with
thousands of people strolling in and around colorful glass
pavilions filled with restaurants and unique shops. However,
by the close of the decade, the bubble had burst. Several
marketplaces were drowning in red ink. Cities were turning
down proposals for festival markets, and developers were loath
to allow their projects to be identified by the term. What
caused this rising star to fall so quickly?
The purpose of this study is to determine what factors
may have contributed to the poor performance of festival
markets. Are there inherent problems with this form of
retailing? What factors in the success of Harborplace and
Faneuil Hall were missing in Richmond? Can cities reap
benefits from faltering festival markets? What crippling
mistakes can cities and developers anticipate and avoid?
To understand the possible pitfalls of this
redevelopment tool, we will look briefly at the history of
festival markets, provide a definition of the concept, and
identify what might be the keys to the success of such
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ventures. We will then apply these factors to a detailed
examination of Richmond's 6th Street Marketplace, the first
festival market to experience so dismal a performance that the
city asked developer James Rouse to leave as equity partner
and manager.
THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF FESTIVAL MARKETS
In 1976 architect Benjamin Thompson teamed with
developer James Rouse to rehabilitate Faneuil Hall, a 18th
century produce market a block from Boston's Harbor. The
project represented the final stage of Mayor Kevin White's
redevelopment of the downtown government center. On opening
day only one building was ready for business. Yet 10,000
people attended the opening ceremonies. About 100,000 people
visited the first day and 10 million people came in the first
year. (1) First year sales were projected at $222 per square
foot, but they actually reached $228, well above that of
conventional shopping centers. {2}
In 1980, Thompson and Rouse built another festival
market in Baltimore's Inner Harbor. Rouse was more
apprehensive about the Baltimore project. The city and the
metropolitan area were much smaller than Boston. "Boston was
the capital of New England with 11 million people. Baltimore
was the capital of nothing with the nation's capitol 35 miles
away." {3} Nevertheless, on opening day half a million
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people came. Over 14 million people visited in the first
year. (4) Harborplace thrived alongside museums, marinas
and an aquarium. In its first year sales per square foot were
anticipated to reach $292, but they amounted to $420. The
city and state expected to receive $2.5 million in taxes but
Harborplace actually generated $3 million in new taxes. {5)
If Faneuil Hall didn't win over the sceptics,
Harborplace did. It proved that the model could be
replicated. However, the formula for the success of these
ventures had not been clearly determined. The prototypes
would have to be evaluated to determine the answers to several
questions. Just who were these customers and where did they
come from? Both Boston and Baltimore were located in large
metropolitan areas. What was the minimum population size
needed to support a festival marketplace? Boston's first year
success was derived from only one component of the project,
the 75,000 square foot Quincy Market. Was this the necessary
critical mass, or could the model be scaled down? Baltimore
was not a tourist city before Harborplace, yet over five
million tourists visited the city in its first full operating
year. {6) Could this model generate such a shot in the arm
for other cities? These ventures were highly profitable,
throwing off twice the revenue of traditional shopping
centers. Each project exceeded pro forma projections by about
28%. (7) Could this new panacea deliver for other downtown
developers?
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In 1981, James Rouse retired from the Rouse Company to
form the Enterprise Development Corporation (EDC), a
for-profit development company. He intended to use the wealth
generated from commercial real estate projects to improve the
housing conditions of the urban poor. Building on the success
of the festival marketplace model, Rouse planned to build
similar projects in smaller cities. Once these projects began
to make a profit, the money would be channeled into the
Enterprise Foundation, the nonprofit conduit for financing low
income housing.
The entry of Enterprise into the festival marketplace
arena marked the beginning of the development of such markets
in small cities. Enterprise also changed the role of local
governments in implementing these projects from facilitators
to shareholders in the risks and rewards. Rouse offered this
description of EDC's first development in Norfolk, Virginia.
The city wanted the project done, and we agreed to
do it if they created a park, put the bulkhead
along the waterfront, provided a garage and put up
all the money for the marketplace. We then
received a fee, and eventually when the project
could pay debt service on the financing, we would
then split the cash flow. So it was a
no-investment, no-risk [deal], and the opportunity
to make money over time. (8)
In 1983 the $13.5 million Waterside project opened along
the Elizabeth River in Norfolk. Enterprise projected first
year sales to reach $250 a square foot. (9) Waterside
generated $340 per square foot in that year, again exceeding
initial forecasts. (10} The project generated 1,200 jobs, and
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brought in $1 million a year in new taxes. In 1989 the city
had plans to expand the marketplace. (11} Subsequent EDC
festival markets have met with less success.
In the mid-'80s problems with the festival market
approach began to surface. In 1984 Enterprise built a $14.5
million project in Toledo, Ohio called Portside. In its first
year the project attracted 4.5 million visitors. Two years
later it was attracting half as many. After putting $1.5
million of its own money into an effort to sustain the
project, EDC was dismissed as manager by the primary lender, a
Toledo bank called Trustcorp. {12}
In 1985 Rouse celebrated the opening of the $15.75
million Water Street Pavilion in Flint, Michigan. Four years
later the merchant stalls in the market were almost empty.
Only a grant from the Mott Foundation has kept it open.
Richmond's $25 million 6th Street Marketplace opened the
same year. The project lost $1.3 million in its first year.
{13} Forced to carry heavy operating deficits, Enterprise
pulled out of both projects. Faced with the prospect of
having to commit public funds on an ongoing basis to proposed
festival markets, Pittsburgh and San Antonio turned down deals
with Enterprise. {14}
Small cities were not the only places having trouble.
The Rouse Company's South Street Seaport in Manhattan lost
money ever since it opened in 1983. By March of 1989 only
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seven of the 22 food outlets that once filled the second floor
were still operating. The rest left because of high rents and
low sales. {15} Two other Rouse Co. projects also lost
money. In New Orleans, Riverwalk generated 15% fewer visits
than expected. The Rouse Co. undertook a $4.5 million
remodeling effort just one year after the marketplace opened
in order to rekindle customer interest. The $93 million
Bayside Marketplace in Miami that opened in April of 1987 fell
$18 million short in sales and two million visitors short in
its first year. {16}
The most telling sign of the growing disillusion with
festival markets was evidenced by the Rouse Company's
announcement in 1987 that it would build no more downtown
specialty marketplaces. {17) Critics viewed this shift in
sentiment by the parent company of festival markets as
signalling the end of an era. Enterprise also pulled back
from further financial exposure. of the nine marketplaces EDC
built since 1981, only five remained in their portfolio by
December 1988. Two of these were for sale. {18} Enterprise
has continued to build festival marketplaces but no longer in
small cities. In 1988 EDC expanded the marketplace concept
overseas with the opening of Darling Harbourside in Sidney,
Australia. Other projects were planned for Glasgow,
Manchester and Birmingham. The company was also looking into
the prospect of building an 80,000 square foot marketplace
near Long Beach, California. {19}
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WHAT IS A FESTIVAL MARKETPLACE
Ask 50 developers for a definition of a "festival
marketplace" and you're likely to get 50 different answers.
Robert Barron, President and Chief Financial Officer of the
Enterprise Development Company, explained that the term had
been applied to such a wide variety of shopping and
entertainment centers that it no longer accurately described
the product. He preferred the term "festival retailing."
In defining the key elements of festival retailing, Mr.
Barron offered a breakdown of the concept's parts: festival,
market, and place.
Place: Festival retailing is creating a human
scale environment and an ambiance that is
attractive to people. It's a special place,
somewhere people want to be for reasons other than
shopping. They want to be there for just for the
sake of being there.
Market: There is commercial activity. It's a
place where goods are sold. But it's more than
that. When we think of a market, we think of the
old stall markets that used to operate in an
earlier period. Quincy market in Boston operated
as a stall market before it was renovated.
Lexington Market in Baltimore is another example
of a 19th century stall market.
Festival: This has several aspects. It's how
the merchandise is presented. It's the type of
merchandise. It's the design of the stores. In
presenting the merchandise we try to be much more
open. For example if you're cooking hamburgers,
we want the grill up at the counter so people can
see the food being made. If it's a bakery, the
customer can see and smell the bread being made.
From a retail store standpoint it's much more open
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in its display and more specialized in its goods.
The festival begins with the festival of the
shops, the store design and the open common area
with kites flying, bright and colorful. This
contributes to a sense of place.
A conventional shopping center is a retail
destination. In a festival market you don't have
retail destinations. What you have are places
that we hope will be enjoyable for people to be
in. The commercial and entertainment elements are
provided to cause people to come to this place.
{20}
Based on this description I would define the concept of
festival retailing as a combination of setting and
merchandising orchestrated to make shopping an entertaining,
recreational experience.
COMMON CHARACTERISTICS
In practice the concept of festival retailing has
several common characteristics.
Anchorless Retail: Typically festival markets are not
anchored by department stores. Since there is no anchor to
draw traffic, the level of patronage depends on a blend of
stores, restaurants and settings that collectively create an
attraction and generate frequent visits. In this regard it is
akin to specialty shopping centers. Specialty centers derive
their sales by attracting return shoppers to a unique mix of
shops. Traditional malls on the other hand, depend on a high
volume of shoppers attracted to department store destinations.
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Tenant Merchandise Mix: What distinguishes a festival
market from a specialty shopping center is its
disproportionate emphasis on food and impulse goods. The
tenant mix focuses on food and retail generally in a 60/40
ratio. {21} A specialty center may concentrate on specific
products like women's fashion stores or on a specific segment
of the market like off-price factory outlets. In each case
the specialty retailer is trying to attract the serious
shopper. Festival markets however, provide what real estate
market analyst Melvin Levine would call "frivolous
merchandise" suited to the impulse shopper looking for unique,
one-of-a-kind items. {22)
Tenant Merchant Mix: The key to creating an inviting and
enjoyable atmosphere is not only the goods sold but also the
enthusiasm, vitality, and dedication to quality shown by the
merchants. Local owner-operated businesses are most likely to
provide this kind of personal attention to shoppers. This
does not deny the potential for larger retailers to have these
qualities. Mr. Barron suggested that some national chains fit
into the format of a festival marketplace. However, most are
not willing to be flexible enough in their merchandising to
blend with the setting. (23} Festival markets have therefore
sought small local merchants who might be operating a single
store or several outlets within the region.
Patrons: The types of goods sold and the recreational
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atmosphere define festival markets as attractions rather than
shopping centers. Mr. Levine noted that about 70% of visitors
come solely for the experience, about 25% intend to eat, and
only 10% intend to shop. Moreover, about 60% of all
marketplace visitors are tourists. {24} Also, expenditures
per customer are very low in comparison with traditional
shopping centers. Festival market expenditures average $4 to
$5 per person compared with $30 to $50 per person at medium to
better quality shopping centers. {25}
Unique architecture or location : In order to create a
distinct and special identity, festival markets are designed
around a unique architectural theme or setting. Historic
restorations and waterfront settings have best served this
purpose. However, other means of creating a unique setting
and identity for such projects may be possible.
Although no specific building types best suit festival
retailing, there are common attributes found in most festival
markets. Exteriors of newly constructed markets consist of
glass and steel structures that display the life within these
facilities. Interior characteristics emphasize large
pedestrian-oriented spaces with a mix of bright colors and
sounds. Banners, shop displays, fountains, and staging areas
for live entertainment provide this festive atmosphere.
Significant pedestrian areas adjacent to festival markets are
also important features.
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Entertainment: The entertainment value of the place
itself and the merchandising within are the primary
attractions of a festival market. Magicians, puppet shows,
and seasonal vendors provide additional attractions. They
strengthen the sense of animation and festivity and bring a
fresh experience to return visitors. Special events
programming is another major feature of festival retailing.
Stages are often provided for city-sponsored events such as
concerts, outdoor exhibits, and annual festivals. These
events promote the marketplace as well as the entire downtown.
The Urban Context: Festival markets have been seen as
tools to revitalize blighted downtowns. Within this setting
retail projects are but one component attracting people. A
minority of the people entering downtown have shopping as
their primary trip purpose. Downtown retailing derives
strength from and gives support to a variety of business,
governmental, cultural, and entertainment activities.
Festival markets can benefit from the synergy of these
activities. It is also true, however, that such projects are
captives of their setting and may have to overcome physical
and psychological resistance to visiting or shopping downtown.
Public Financing: Large-scale urban projects generally
have heavy front-end costs such as land acquisition and site
improvements. Festival markets are expensive to build and
operate due in part to the size and extensive use of common
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areas. In 1984, Rouse estimated that a typical project cost
over $200 per square foot to construct. {26} These projects
are riskier than suburban shopping centers and returns on
investment are not immediately realized. Bank and equity
financing is often hard to find. For these reasons and
others, public financial support has been essential.
In many cities festival marketplaces have obtained
substantial federal funding. Columnist Neal Peirce reported
that HUD records show 12 such projects received more than $110
million in Urban Development Action Grant funds as of 1988.
The corresponding city governments contributed another $168
million in public funds. {27}
KEY INGREDIENTS FOR SUCCESS
Whether a marketplace is considered a success depends on
one's point of view. Developers define success as a project
that earns a profit, has few vacancies, and is well received
by the merchants and their customers. City officials, on the
other hand, may be proud of a project that brings life to a
blighted downtown. If a project is to satisfy both
definitions several conditions are essential.
Given the high costs and significant risks involved,
festival markets cannot be developed without broad community
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support. An entrepreneurial local government willing to share
the risks, assist the developer in navigating the approval
process, garner business support, and provide public financing
is necessary to initiate these projects. Community consensus
and political support for public financial assistance is
essential and can only be achieved through aggressive public
and private sponsorship.
Because per-person expenditures are low, festival
markets must draw from a regional base sufficient to sustain
the volume of sales needed to support the facility. Within
that base, the marketplace must have access to a variety of
customer markets. Cyril Paumier, in describing Faneuil Hall's
customer profile, described the breadth that was available in
Boston. He cautioned against developing festival markets in
communities unable to offer such a variety of users.
The composite profile of Faneuil Hall Marketplace
in Boston includes downtown, suburban, and exurban
residents; downtown office and other workers;
visitors to the state and regional capital for a
variety of business and other purposes; tourists
and travelers to and through New England in all
seasons; students, faculty, and visitors to the
city's many institutions of higher learning;
diners and entertainment seekers; and a steady
percentage of foreign visitors. In all some 15
million visits a year are recorded against a
project of 220,000 square feet. (28)
Since the marketplace is primarily an attraction rather
than a shopping center, the amount of money spent per customer
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is a function of the amount of time spent in the facility.
Therefore, there must be a critical mass of leasable space
large enough to provide a variety of recreational and retail
events. These activities must sustain interest and keep
visitors on the site for several hours.
Festival markets must be located in places of high
amenity that people already visit or want to visit just for
the sake of being there. They are meant to be special places
within a setting that is itself an amenity. Festival markets
do not create the attraction so much as augment it. They are
not meant to stand alone but to increase the volume of
visitors attracted to this special place. Pedestrian-oriented
settings with large public areas are needed to accommodate the
volume of visitors and to link the market with other nearby
attractions.
If the promotions held at the marketplace are going to
benefit downtown as a whole, they must be coordinated with the
parades, concerts, and other special events occurring
throughout the city. To manage this effort the city must be
willing to establish and fund an office of downtown
promotions.
The desire to recruit unique merchants not found in
regional shopping centers carries the risk of selecting
merchants who are unfamiliar with this retailing format.
Although they might be very successful as a stand-alone shop
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or within a neighborhood center, the merchandizing,
maintenance, and financial requirements may present aspects of
retailing they have not experienced. Such merchants need care
and nurturing if they are to survive.
PART II
RICHMOND CASE STUDY
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Throughout its history Richmond has been blessed with a
strong and stable economy. While the tobacco industry is by
far the largest employer, the region continues to maintain a
stable mix of other manufacturing industries like metal
production, paper, printing and apparel. Also, Richmond has
been able to make the shift from manufacturing to a service
economy. As the state capital, the city has benefited from
continued growth in government employment. However, despite
such economic stability Richmond's historical retail core
along Broad and Grace Streets experienced a decline as one by
one stores moved out to the suburbs. These stores were
replaced by discount stores, carry out restaurants and
marginal shops. By the mid-1960's the health of the retail
core was tenuously held together by the presence of the
flagship department stores of Thalhimers and Miller & Rhoads.
These stores were located side-by-side along 6th Street. {29}
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The history of urban renewal in downtown Richmond began
with the construction of the Coliseum in 1964 on the northern
edge of the retail district. In 1968 the city studied the
area around the Coliseum. The possibility of a convention
center was discussed, but no action was taken. In 1974 the
City Council appointed a Downtown Development Commission to
study a wide range of issues. The Commission hired a
consultant to prepare a feasibility study for the construction
of a convention center. In January of 1976 the Commission
submitted the downtown's first formal plan called "A Strategy
for Action." It outlined a general development program. Based
on the consultant's recommendations, the Commission proposed
the development of a 186,000 square foot convention center
with 80,000 square feet of exhibition space. They also
identified a top priority redevelopment site and called it
Project One.
This nine block site was bounded by Broad Street, 7th
Street , Clay Street , and 4th Street. {Figure 1} The
Commission recommended that Project One be a mixed-use
development undertaken as a private/public venture. In May of
1976 the city issued a Request for Proposals for the
development of the Project One site and selected Gerald Hines
Inc. as the developer. However, downtown renewal stalled when
Hines withdrew the following year. {30}
The election of 1977 brought about a significant change
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in Richmond's political environment. After a seven year court
battle, the U.S. Supreme Court forced Richmond to end
at-large elections and form a councilmanic ward system.
Richmond voters elected a black majority City Council. In
accordance with the city charter, the council selected the
city's first black mayor, Henry Marsh. The white City Manager
was fired and replaced by a black. The racial tension and
mistrust spawned by these events cast a shadow over
redevelopment efforts for several years. {31}
Mayor Marsh's efforts to implement Project One met with
stiff opposition. In this conservative city the use of
eminent domain to acquire private property was highly unusual.
That a black mayor was perpetrating this act made the battle
between the black politicians and the largely white business
community more frustrating and bitter. However, by 1980 the
city had completed the acquisition, relocation, and demolition
of the Project One site and had acquired the existing parking
garage at 6th and Marshall Street. Later that year they
selected a local developer, Robert C. Elder, to build the
office component. In September of 1981 they entered into an
agreement with Landmarks Inc. a Minnesota based firm, for the
development of a hotel. {32}
THE BIRTH OF RICHMOND RENAISSANCE
In the midst of the frustration of his early years in
office, Mayor Marsh appointed T. Justin Moore, then Chairman
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of Virginia Electric Power Company, to head a committee to
study the prospects for downtown revitalization. Realizing
that progress was impossible without cooperation between the
white business leadership and the black city government, Mayor
Marsh encouraged Mr. Moore to bridge this gulf and open
communication between these groups. In 1982 these efforts
gave birth to Richmond Renaissance.
Richmond Renaissance, Inc. was a bi-racial, non-profit,
public/private partnership created to foster cooperation
among the racial communities, ease communications between the
community and local government, and stimulate downtown
economic development. The organization had a 60-member board
composed of the presidents and chief executive officers of 27
Richmond area firms, augmented by elected political leaders,
city administrators, and community leaders. The board was
50% black and 50% white. T. Justin Moore served as the first
board chairman and Henry Marsh's successor, Roy West, became
its first president. The private sector contributed $2
million toward the organization's initial budget, and the city
council responded with an appropriation of $1.25 million from
its Community Development Block Grant funds. (33}
Beyond having these 30 whites and 30 blacks sitting
together, Justin Moore and Henry Marsh knew that there had to
be some tangible manifestation of this new partnership. J.
Randall Evans, the first executive director of Richmond
Renaissance, recalled that while these men were trying to
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think of what that might be, they invited James Rouse to speak
to civic leaders. Rouse spoke of his vision of the rebirth of
cities and the potential impact of festival markets. The next
day Rouse toured Richmond and looked at several sites the city
officials wanted to develop. It was suggested that he locate
near the James River waterfront, but he insisted that the
project reinforce the downtown retail core. This brought him
back to a site he had considered before. About ten years
earlier the Rouse Company had considered an idea of combining
the two large department stores. Rouse came up with the idea
of building a "bridge over Broad Street" that would connect
these anchors. This idea was so in tune with the community's
goals that Mr. Evans commented...
Who cared about the market or real estate basis
for the project. Broad Street was the historical
dividing line between black and white Richmond
[blacks on the north and whites on the south]. In
the mind of Richmonders there was a big difference
between the north and south side of Broad Street.
So the idea of bridging this street took on many
meanings. It was bridging this physical barrier,
this mental barrier. It would symbolize the
partnership between black and white, public and
private. You could think about all the speeches
that could be written with this idea. {34}
The prospect of reinforcing the downtown retail core
and linking the department stores with the new Marriott Hotel,
the Elder office building, the planned convention center and
the Coliseum was in keeping with the objectives of the Project
One renewal effort. That there was no opposition to this idea
was a tribute to the accomplishments of Marsh and Moore in
forming Richmond Renaissance. Evans noted that...
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All the money, corporate interests, political
interests, community interests were all on the
board. If there were any opposing views, you
would hear it there first. And after consensus
was reached by the board, who in their right mind
was going to stand up and say 'but I am against
this.' {35}
The source of the idea also enhanced its credibility.
Deputy City Manager Jack Berry recalled...
Everybody was enamored with Rouse. He was the
genius who had brought back cities - Time
magazine's Man of the Year. Everybody was so
excited that Rouse was willing to come here and
help us to do to our downtown what he had done to
Baltimore's. {36}
PREDEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES
With this grand idea in hand, Renaissance took on the
role of project catalyst. They hired a local architectural
firm to provide conceptual site plans and elevations. Funds
were provided to Enterprise to pay for a market study.
The market study was prepared by Melvin Levine &
Associates and submitted in October of 1982. This analysis
indicated that marketplace sales would be drawn from four
market sectors. The Richmond SMSA (the City and six
surrounding counties) would provide 53% of the customers; 17%
would come from the 24 Outer Richmond counties; another 17%
would come from the 55,000 employees in downtown Richmond; and
13% from visitors staying in downtown hotels. (37)
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Since Faneuil Hall and Harborplace were the only
comparable projects in operation at that time, customer
surveys of the Baltimore project were used to determine market
share capture rates and expenditures. Based on these
assumptions the first year (1986) sales volume for a 60,000
square foot facility was estimated at $18.7 million. Sales
productivity was projected to be $312 per square foot. {38}
It was estimated that the marketplace would attract 3.5
to 4 million annual visitors. Many of these visitors would be
drawn from existing attractions. Miller & Rhoads and
Thalhimers attracted an estimated 1.5 to 2 million customers
annually. The Coliseum had drawn 582,000 patrons during the
'81-'82 season. The Virginia Center for the Performing Arts
anticipated about 150,000 patrons. New visitors also would
come from increased convention traffic upon completion of the
Convention Center. {39)
Enterprise was still a fledgling organization in 1982.
The Norfolk project was underway and several other
marketplaces were under discussion; but the firm did not have
a reservoir of capital to invest in these ventures. Before
proceeding, Enterprise sought to ensure that the marketplace
would be seen as a civic endeavor. In this partnership EDC
would provide the development and management expertise while
the city would provide the site and financing. Moreover
Enterprise asked the city to provide the following specific
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services:
1) Approximately 350 additional parking spaces would
be added to the downtown.
2) A shuttle bus system would be developed to provide
access from distant parts of the city - especially
up the steep hill between the market and the
financial district.
3) The city would establish an Office of Downtown
Promotion to provide ongoing promotional and
public relations activities for the festival
marketplace and the total downtown area.
4) The city would strike the blue laws that would
prevent sales on Sunday, an important day of
activity for the center.
5) The city would provide extraordinary security and
maintenance in the development area to bolster and
maintain the exciting image portrayed by the
festival marketplace.
6) The city would help Enterprise with land
assemblage.
7) The city would coordinate the assemblage of the
financial package, including contacting and
negotiating financial support from local banks and
corporate investors.
The city agreed to each of the issues and signed a letter of
intent with Enterprise in November of 1983. {40}
The additional parking requested by Enterprise was
provided by an 800 car garage located adjacent to the
northernmost section of the project. An overhead bridge
linked the Marriott Hotel and the Convention Centre to this
facility. Financing was provided by a $4.5 million revenue
bond. {41} A 600 car garage located to the rear of the
Project One office building was purchased and renovated by the
Richmond Redevelopment & Housing Authority. It provided
direct parking access to the central block of the marketplace.
24
The trolley was an easy sell. The city's financial
district was located between Main Street and the James River
about four to six blocks away. To travel from this area to
6th street was a trek up a very steep hill. Since the city
desired to connect the retail and financial districts the
trolley would provide quick lunchtime and early evening
transport. A one way trolley ride followed a 12 block route
and cost a quarter. The trolleys were operated Monday through
Friday and were scheduled every six minutes during lunchtime
and less frequently in non-peak hours. {42}
The birth of the promotions office, Downtown Presents
Inc., was more difficult. Mr. Evans recalled that this was a
political football. At issue was not the need for an office
to promote downtown, but who would run it. The city manager's
office, the Central Richmond Association of downtown
merchants, Historic Richmond Inc., all had designs on this
office. Eventually an independent board was establish to
oversee its operations.
Additional security was provided by placing a small
police patrol station at Broad and 5th Street. The blue laws
were eliminated by the State Legislature.
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
The most difficult obstacle Renaissance had to face was
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land assemblage. The siting of the marketplace required
access to or acquisition of properties under the control of
six different owners. Negotiations had to be completed with
all of the concerned parties so that the developer would
control one contiguous parcel. The most difficult of these
was the negotiation of Thalhimers' acquisition of the land
under its department store that was leased from the estate of
Robert E. Lee. Thalhimers had been unsuccessful in previous
attempts to purchase the site. Soliciting the assistance of
Governor Charles Robb, the city convinced the Lee estate to
relent. Renaissance then formed a shell company, Festival
Diogenes Corporation (FDC), with Evans as its President. This
corporation secured a long term leasehold interest from each
owner for a nominal annual rent. FDC then master leased these
interests for 99 years to the Enterprise subsidiary, Richmond
Festival Marketplace Partnership. {43}
The master lease defined how the city and developer
would share the monetary benefits of this public/private
partnership. FDC would charge the Marketplace Partnership an
annual base rent of $1,000 and a percentage rent equal to 40%
of the net cash flow after debt service. After the first 15
years the percentage would be reduced to 15%. As an incentive
to manage the project profitably, the Marketplace Partnership
would receive an increasing percentage of the available cash
flow up to a flat rate of $195,000. On the third anniversary
of completion, the Partnership would receive a development fee
of $300,000 paid quarterly over five years. {44}
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FINANCIAL STRUCTURE
Obtaining financial support from local lenders and
investors was somewhat easier. With the help of the
Renaissance board, the private sector enthusiastically
performed its civic duty. Five Richmond Banks- United
Virginia Bank, Consolidated Bank, Sovran Bank, Bank of
Virginia, and Central Fidelity Bank provided a conventional
loan of $4.8 million and purchased a revenue bond of $1
million. The term of each loan was 32 years and they were
secured by first and second leasehold mortgages. Interest
rates on the loans were 10.5% and 12% respectively. These
rates were well below market rates at the time and indicated
the banks' willingness to shoulder the added risk required to
make the project work. {45}
Equity financing was provided by a six-member limited
partnership that raised $2.5 million in syndication proceeds.
The partnership was formed by Wheat First Securities, and
included Ethyl Corporation, James River Corp., A.H. Robbins
Inc, Best Products and Circuit City. These corporations
originally planned to provide $3.13 million. This commitment
was reduced when the National Park Service denied historic tax
credits for the rehabilitation of the Blues Armory. {46} A
$500,000 donation from the two department stores and city
funds filled this gap. {47}
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The city's share of direct construction costs came from
several sources, a $4.2 million Urban Development Action Grant
(UDAG), $1.7 million in Community Development Block Grant
funds, and $6.8 million in city funds administered by the
Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority. These funds
were pooled to form a $3.2 million grant and a $9.5 million
loan secured by a third mortgage on the leasehold elements.
Repayment terms were structured as a percentage of available
cash flow after debt service was paid to the senior lenders.
If funds were not available to cover the city's debt, payments
would be deferred with interest accruing on the outstanding
principal at a blended interest rate of 3.5% to 4.2%. Minimum
payments of $100,000 became due in the sixth year of
operations. {48}
The city's financial obligations did not end there. An
additional $2.5 million in HUD Section 108 funds were
allocated to pay for the public infrastructure. This involved
the relocation of utilities, closing streets, paving
sidewalks, landscaping, and building a park at the north end
of the marketplace. Finally, in addition to providing the
staff time and funds for the cost of the feasibility studies,
Richmond Renaissance obtained $800,000 in local business
contributions toward the construction costs. {49}
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Public/Private Financial Contributions Summary
Public Partners
City of Richmond
City of Richmond
City of Richmond
Housing Authority
Housing Authority
Private Partners
5 Bank Consortium
5 Bank Consortium
6 Limited Partners
Department Stores
Non Profit Partner
Renaissance Inc.
Amount
$1,750,000
$2,500,000
$4,200,000
$1,481,200
$5,345,000
$4,870,000
$1,000,000
$2,535,000
$500,000
Type
Grant
Grant
Loan
Grant
Grant
Loan
Loan
Equity
Donation
Source
CDBG Funds
HUD Sec. 108
UDAG Funds
City Budget
City Budget
Commercial Mortgage
Revenue Bonds
Investors
Department Stores
$800,000 Donation Local Businesses
Cost Overrun Funding
Housing Authority
Housing Authority
5 Bank Consortium
Enterprise Corp.
Total Funds
$2,719,000
$481,000
$900,000
$650,000
$29,731,200
Loan
Grant
Loan
Equity
City Budget
City Budget
Increase
Internal Funds
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PROJECT DESCRIPTION
The site of the Marketplace extended along a
three-block section of 6th street from Grace Street north to
Clay Street. {Figure 2} The Marketplace linked several
important downtown landmarks: the Virginia Center for the
Performing Arts, Thalhimers and Miller & Rhoads department
stores, the 210,000 square foot Project One office building,
the 403 room Marriott Hotel, the rehabilitated Light Infantry
Blues Armory, and the 11,000 seat Richmond Coliseum. {50} The
area adjacent to the Armory contained a festival park for
outdoor concerts, art shows, and other cultural events. The
Richmond Convention and Exhibition Centre was located just one
block west.
The marketplace itself had a gross building area of
120,000 square feet and 66,919 square feet of leasable area.
It was composed of three sections, each with a specific
commercial theme. {Figure 3)The southernmost block at Grace
and Broad Streets provided access to the two department stores
through a palm-lined, two-level court. This section contained
30,559 square feet of leasable space. Most of this was carved
out of space donated by the department stores. It featured a
major restaurant and specialty retail shops. The Palm Court
shops were fashion-oriented and featured women's apparel,
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AN OVERVIEW OF CITY SQUARE
The Shops At City Square
a
Figure #2
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Carpenter Center Box Office ............... 782-3900
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May 1-31 Physical Fitness and Sports Month
May 1-31 Barbecue Month
May 5, 12, Friday Cheers! Festival Park-5-830 pm
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May 5 Bobby Brown! Coliseum-7:30 pm
May 6 Champagne Pops / Carpenter Center-8:00 pm
May 7 Stu Gardner Orchestra
Carpenter Center-8pm
May 7-10 Eastern Star Convention
May 9 Richmond Symphony Featuring Itzhak Perlman/
Carpenter Center-8 pm
May 11 Tour de Trump / Shockoe Slip-TBA
May i Red Man Country Tour / Coliseum-8:00 pm
May 13 & 15 Richmond Symphony / Carpenter Center-8 pm
May 14 MOTHER'S DAY
May 16 My One and Only / Carpenter Center-8 pm
May 17 Virginia Lottery Media Event / Food Court-12:30 pm
May 19 & 20 VCU Commencement / Coliseum
May 19 & 20 Resolutions / Carpenter Center-8:00 pm
May 20 VCU School of Business Graduation / Carpenter
Center-11 am -3 pm
May 21 National Wrestling Alliance / Coliseum- call for details
May 22 Virginia Lottery Kick-off / Festival Park-Noon
May 29 MEMORIAL DAY OBSERVED
JUN
June 1-30 Adopt a Cat Month
June 1-30 American Rivers Month
June 2,9,
16,23,30 Friday Cheers / Festival Park-5 pm-8:30 pm
June 9-11 June Jubilee / In & Around 6th Street- call Arts Council
for details
June 11 Richmond Public School Baccalaureate / Coliseum-TBA
Ju" 1" Leonard vs. Hearns (dosed circuit) / Coliseum-9:00 pm
June 14 Fla Day
June 1 FATHER'S DAY
June 23 Cheers and More Cheers / Festival Park-9-00 pm
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jewelry, women's shoes, and crafts selected to complement the
department stores.
The centerpiece of the design was a glass-enclosed
bridge linking the south and north sides of Broad Street. At
its center were two 10 foot wide stained glass windows
displaying the project's insignia. The bridge could be
accessed from the second level of Palm Court. It stretched
125 feet across Broad and was connected by an escalator to the
middle block known as Renaissance Court.
Renaissance Court contained 12,041 square feet nestled
within a narrow pass between the Marriott and the Project One
office building. This section housed both stores found in a
neighborhood shopping center and stores that focused on a
specific theme. You could find a newspaper stand, record
store, and an athletic shoe store along with shops selling
only sunglasses or greeting cards that display only cats and
dogs.
The project's northernmost block consisted of a
five-story steel and glass atrium called the Crystal Palace.
The atrium was affixed on one side to the historic Blues
Armory. This section contained space for two major
restaurants, a produce market, and the project's food court.
The placement of 23,227 square feet of food services in the
this section of the market was designed to provide a strong
counterpull to the anchor department stores. It also allowed
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the food court to remain open for evening entertainment
without creating security problems for the department stores
and specialty shops. {51)
Leasing Effort
Leasing for the project officially started in September
of 1984. Almost 1,000 people came to the newly opened
Marriott Hotel to receive a promotional pitch from the
developer. Nancy Jones, EDC's Leasing Director, noted that
this was three times the normal turnout for such an event.
(52) Ms. Jones and staff from Richmond Renaissance attended
many meetings to introduce the project to prospective local
entrepreneurs and the broader community. Regional merchants
were recruited from the Virginia Beach-Tidewater area,
Roanoke, Charlotte, Charlottesville, and the
Washington-Baltimore area. Such national merchants as
Benetton's, Pappagallo's, Paul Harris, Connie Shoes,
Caswell-Massey, and Sam Goody were attracted to the market.
All of the regional merchants were new to the Richmond area,
and of the national franchises, only Connies and Sam Goody
were located in other regional malls at the time. {53}
The original leasing plan envisioned three full-service
restaurants, an ice cream parlor, 41 retail shops, 18 kiosks,
10 food shops, 17 specialty food stalls, and 10 pushcarts.
{54) Rents and lease terms varied depending on the type of
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merchant. A small shop might rent for $10-$12 per square foot
while a pushcart dealer might pay $200 for his space. A
pushcart lease might run for one week while a restaurant lease
would run for ten years. Additional rent charges to cover
common area maintenance, insurance, utilities, and taxes were
expected to range from $20-$22 per square foot. (55)
MINORITY PARTICIPATION
In the atmosphere of suspicion that persisted after
Mayor Marsh's election, it was very important that the
marketplace not be seen as an all white enterprise - that it
truly serve as a bridge between the black and white
communities. To achieve this objective, Rouse and City
Manager Manuel Deese negotiated an aggressive affirmative
action program. The "Deese-Rouse" plan required that
minorities would constitute no less than 30% of the
construction workforce, and at least 10% of the center's
operations staff. Also, at least 15% of the marketplace
tenants would be minority owned businesses. (56}
The city and developer recognized that a festival market
would present local merchants with unfamiliar management
decisions. Moreover, minority businesses had the added burden
of limited access to quality legal, accounting, and financial
advice. Therefore, the city, business, and academic community
combined to develop a 9-month training program. Prospective
minority tenants attended evening courses in management,
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marketing and tax strategies sponsored by Virginia Union
University and the Richmond Business School. The consortium
of five banks that financed the marketplace established a
special small business loan pool of $1.25 million. Eight
major accounting firms and six law firms provided technical
assistance to participating merchants for up to a year. {57)
As a result, 21 of the 63 tenants present on opening day were
minority businesses. Two years later 18 of these firms were
still operating. {58}
To insure minority participation in the project's
construction, minority business requirements were included in
construction contracts. Meeting this goal sometimes required
splitting contracts so that small minority subcontractors
could bid on the job. As a result, 40% of the construction
dollars went to minority firms. {59} To secure permanent jobs
for minorities, the city established a "hiring hall"
specifically for the use of marketplace tenants. Over 680
pre-screened applicants were referred to the merchants
resulting in 282 placements. Minorities composed 80% of those
hired. {60}
PERFORMANCE
The marketplace opened on September 18, 1985 with a
celebration attended by thousands. On that day 53 retail
stores, food shops and kiosks along with 16 pushcarts opened
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for business. (61) It was hailed as the cornerstone of the
Project One renewal plan. It would breathe new life into the
Broad Street retail district. Mayor West noted that the idea
of the Marketplace had flourished because of the growing
harmony between blacks and whites. He noted that business
investors were taking note of Richmond because the political
scene was less racially tainted. (62} The "Bridge over
Broad" was beginning to serve its symbolic purpose.
But, the honeymoon was short lived. During the first
winter a faulty heating system made temperatures almost as
cold as outdoors. Nancy Jones recalled that some days the
temperature got down to 50 degrees. This did not help the
leasing effort. Customers stayed away. After the first
Christmas shopping season, the department stores that had
agreed to keep the same hours as the marketplace returned to
closing at 5:30 and 6:00pm. The evening traffic did not
justify later hours. Temperature problems continued into the
summer as the air conditioning periodically broke down.
Merchants began to complain to the management and to their
council representatives. {63)
Despite these problems, the market had a healthy first year.
Occupancy had increased to 70 shops and restaurants or 84% of
the gross leasable area. {64) None of the minority businesses
had failed. The market had lost only one specialty store and
a few kiosks and pushcarts - the fewest number of first year
failures in any Rouse marketplace. {65)
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On September 18, 1986 the marketplace held a birthday
party, the inauguration of a four day celebration of its first
anniversary. Mayor West was there to cut the cake. Rouse
reported that the center had sales of $240 per square foot.
This waswell under the $312 per square foot Enterprise had
estimated. However, he predicted that occupancy would reach
95% soon. {66}
By December the initial optimism was beginning to fade.
In an effort to expedite the construction of 6th Street,
Enterprise prepared their construction budget on conceptual
plans that had not been thoroughly analyzed. As a result,
unforseen conditions increased the construction costs above
the available funds. Operating costs for the first year were
also much higher than expected. Real estate taxes were three
times higher than projected. Insurance, lighting and heating
costs were also major offenders. (67) In part these problems
were also the result of expeditious construction decisions.
However, government requirements that were not controlled by
the developer also increased operating costs. Enterprise
found that they were unable to pay operating expenses and debt
service without increasing the common area maintenance fees
and asking the city for additional financing.
Recognizing that the project was proceeding on a fast
track, the city anticipated most of the construction overruns
and included a $1.5 million contingency fund in the
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Development Agreement. {68} However, they were reluctant to
cover operating and debt service expenses unless the developer
assumed more of the financial risk. Negotiations resulted in
a $150,000 reduction in the development fee and a $650,000
equity investment by Enterprise. The five bank consortium
that provided the original loans increased their exposure by
$900,000. A portion of this amount went toward paying the
project's first year debt service. With greater private
investment in hand, the city council approved $3.2 million in
new financing. A $481,000 grant was provided to cover
operating deficits and a $2.7 million loan paid for the
construction overruns. {69}
Some merchants, however, had begun to lose faith in
Enterprise. Private complaints were now being voiced in the
press. Staff turnover also contributed to tenant anxieties.
In the first year of the project the merchants had worked with
two project managers and four marketing directors. {70} In
February of 1987 the problems boiled over into the courtroom.
Eight merchants filled a lawsuit. They claimed that the
developer had deliberately made false representations to
entice them to lease space and then failed to live up to these
promises. Specifically, they alleged that Enterprise had
promised 3.5 million potential customers a year, a vigorous
marketing program, greater seating capacity in the food court
and adequate heating and air conditioning. {71}
Most of the suits were settled out of court. Some
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tenants left voluntarily, some renegotiated their lease terms,
while others were evicted for failing to pay rent. The
publicity surrounding the request for additional financing and
the lawsuit began to sour the public's perception of the
marketplace. These news articles broke whatever momentum the
market had gained. By March of 1987 there were only 62
tenants, down from 71 just the year before. The marketplace
had lost nine of the original major tenants. {72}
In July City Manager Robert Bobb sent a confidential
memo to city council informing them that the marketplace
needed additional and ongoing financial support. He reported
that rent reductions, litigation expenses, vacancies and
lower than expected patronage had created greater operating
losses than had been projected in December. New projections
prepared by Enterprise indicated a cumulative loss of $5.9
million through 1991. (731 If the city chose to continue to
support the market it was necessary to take greater control of
the project. News accounts of this memo reported part of the
text to read:
We are the developers because whenever there is a
problem in terms of income and operating capital,
it's the city's problem. We're the ones at risk;
and because we're the ones at risk, we have to
play a hands-on role in what's happening at the
6th Street Marketplace and work with Enterprise
and other experts to make [the marketplace] a
competitive center that can achieve the things it
was set up to achieve. {74}
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Bobb stated that the marketplace needed some adjusting away
from "cutesy, trendy" items toward more serious retail shops.
The merchant mix needed to be more competitive with suburban
retail malls. It needed more upscale and nationally
recognized stores. Although EDC had not been aware of the
city's plans, they welcomed the dialogue. The city council
set up a two man committee to help Bobb negotiate these
financial and management changes. {75}
By the end of its second year, (Sept '87) the market was
generating about $221 per square foot and showed a net loss of
$1.1 million. Since its opening 16 merchants had left and 53
of a potential 75 shops were open. {76} However, EDC Project
Manager Ted Cosmos stated that only six of the 16 who left
were true business failures. The others were breaking even
financially but either didn't want to wait out the rough times
or had other reasons for leaving. {77}
The second anniversary of the Marketplace was heralded
by a series of newspaper articles detailing the problems of
6th Street and other EDC markets in Flint and Toledo. In
October, Mr. Rouse and several city boosters held a news
conference to announce increased sales and new leases.
Another objective however, was to encourage the media to
report the positive progress the market was making. Rouse was
joined by representatives from Richmond Renaissance, Downtown
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Presents, Central Richmond Association, Miller & Rhoads,
Thalhimers, and The Richmond Marriott. Conspicuously absent
from the gathering was Mayor West. {78} The strain the
press was placing on the project was evident. Rouse was
quoted to say...
"We hope the media can see this as a place that
deserves whole attention. Stories of success are
at least as important as the other stories. It is
very damaging when a stream of negative reports
come out about a project like the Marketplace."
{79}
By February of 1988 it became clear that negotiations
between the city and Enterprise were not resolving differences
over management and financial problems. Sales for the
calender year of 1987 were down to $208 per square foot.
Only 47 tenants remained, occupying about 78% of the leasable
space. {80} Having spent almost $2 million on operating
deficits, Enterprise was unwilling to continue to cover this
expense. The city on the other hand was already feeling
budget pressures from police and other employees and was
reluctant to provide more money without a significant change
in direction. Therefore, at the city's request Enterprise
agreed to pull out. {81} In the severance agreement the city
agreed to pay Enterprise $750,000 to partially recoup their
losses. EDC agreed to continue managing the project until a
successor could be found. {82)
In July of 1988 the city hired Goodman Segar Hogan Inc.
of Norfolk, Va. as the new manager. To maintain the tax
status of the limited partners, Enterprise was replaced as
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general partner by Festival Diogenes. FDC then master leased
the project to the Housing Authority. The Housing Authority
hired the new management. Goodman Segar Hogan did not take on any
ownership responsibilities, so outstanding expenses had to be
covered by the city. {83}
In addition, funds had to be found for tenant
improvements needed to reposition the facility as a
destination shopping center. To meet these expenses the
'88-'89 city budget allocated $4 million to be administered by
the Housing Authority. Over $2.5 million of that amount was
designated for operating deficits. The same amount was
allocated in the '89-'90 budget. Projections of future
deficits suggest that $2.5 to $3 million will be needed from
the city through 1993. {84} Deputy City Manager Berry did
not anticipate breaking even anytime soon and expected the
city's commitment to be ongoing. "We have to think of this
project as a piece of city infrastructure, like a bridge or
park." {85}
By the summer of 1989 the marketplace occupancy was down
to 37 tenants, only 23 of that were among the original
tenants. (861 Goodman Segar Hogan had made progress in
correcting the heating and air conditioning system that
continued to operate at only 80% efficiency. They had also
fixed a leaking roof in the food court. They conducted a
customer survey to determine who was shopping at the center,
and refocused their advertising campaign to emphasize the
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project's convenience to the
Uniform operating hours were
customer's perception of the
marketplace site as a retail
breaking even, they reported
total income from the center
projections. {87)
downtown office population.
established to improve the
combined department store and
destination. Although far from
that their efforts had increased
by 20% over '88-'89
Goodman Segar Hogan was also preparing to launch a new
promotional and leasing effort. The center's name would be
changed to The Shops at City Square and the marketing would
focus on improvements to the entire Project One area.
Streetscape improvements such as brick sidewalks, special
light fixtures, banners, and benches were scheduled to be
completed by the Fall. Building renovation plans were under
consideration that would increase the leasable area by 40,000
square feet by carving out more square footage from the
department stores and the Project One office building. The
new leasing plan would focus on regional and national
retailers that would establish the center as a shopping
destination. {88}
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PART III
WHAT WENT WRONG
No single mistake caused the poor performance of the 6th
Street Marketplace. At the time it was planned festival
markets were highly experimental. A combination of elements
seemed to be working in Boston and Baltimore, but nobody knew
the necessary or sufficient causes of their success. In an
interview with Neal Peirce, Rouse offered this explanation of
the poor performance of small city marketplaces...
All of these centers had initial success, were
enormously celebrated and created a whole new
spirit and potential. What went wrong is that the
metropolitan areas weren't big enough and the
attractions of the center city were not sufficient
[to support them]. {89}
The Richmond experience exemplifies the need for a large
trade area and for sufficient complementary attractions.
However, it also shows that mistakes made by both the city
and the developer in pursuit of a "noble idea" compounded
these problems.
INHERENT PROBLEMS
Festival markets appeal to a very narrow customer
market, primarily upper-middle-income, impulse shoppers. A
large portion of these have to be imported. Once attracted to
the facility, visitors must find sufficient activities to hold
their attention. The aggregate population needed to support
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such a market, its dependence on tourists, and the scale of
facility required were unknown at the time 6th Street
Marketplace was planned.
Even as he blazed the trail into smaller cities, Rouse
knew there would be a threshold below which the market could
not be supported. With anticipated per person expenditures
averaging only $4.00 to $6.00, a large regional population
base was essential. At the time the 6th Street Marketplace
was being planned, the smallest metropolitan area Rouse had
ventured into was Norfolk with an SMSA population of 1.2
million. The Richmond SMSA was home to about 735,000
residents. {90) This level of market support proved to be
inadequate. Mr. Levine now counsels cities that a regional
population of 1 million residents is the lowest threshold.
{91}
As the festival markets were downsized to what was a
proportionate scale for smaller cities, revenues were not
sufficient to cover expenses. The synergy of events was not
enough to attract and hold adequate crowds. Mr. Levine
explained how the problems of area population and building
size were related.
When you talk about attractions the amount of
money spent is a function of the time you spend
there. In this sense the marketplace is more like
theme parks or other entertainment centers.
People spend money at an entertainment center at a
rate of about $2.50 an hour. So you have to have
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enough stuff there to keep people's attention for
enough time to spend about $5.00 per visit. We
had a meeting at Enterprise to discuss this around
the time that they opened Portside which was about
60,000 square feet. We determined that 80,000
square feet was the smallest you could go. It
takes two hours to go through an 80,000 square
foot center and that was what we needed to make it
work.
Given the capture rates we'd seen for the share of
sales attributable to local residents, it would
take a million residents to have dollar
expenditures sufficient to support half of an
80,000 square foot center. The other half would
come from tourists. {92)
Tourism was the second largest industry in Virginia
generating over $3 million in travel expenditures per year.
{93} City officials hoped the marketplace would help to
increase their share of the tourist market. However, Richmond
faced a chicken-or-egg dilemma. Would a festival market
increase the tourism base or be forced to survive within the
constraints of the existing tourist base? Although Richmond
was blessed with several points of interest, no vacation
resort or single attraction of national significance existed.
Norfolk, on the other hand, attracted visitors from the
vacation homes of nearby Virginia Beach.
The Richmond experience indicates the need for a
pre-existing tourist base. For example in 1986, when
Waterside and 6th Street were both operating, total travel
expenditures for Richmond were $114.6 million while in Norfolk
the amount was $206.4 million. In Virginia Beach 1986 tourist
expenditures were $431.8 million. Although tourist
expenditures for Richmond increased at a greater rate than
Norfolk or Virginia Beach between 1985 and 1987, the total
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volume was not enough to support the marketplace. (94) Only
4% of the patrons at 6th Street in 1988 were tourists. {95}
An important target market never arrived.
C
$ Thousands
Richmond
Norfolk
Virginia Beach
omparison of Tourist Expenditures
1985 1986 1987
88,077
207,308
404,817
120,898
230,270
433,523
152,828
246,954
459,082
Nor did Richmond have the broad customer base to make up
for the low tourist traffic. A 1988 Goodman Segar Hogan
customer survey found that, in addition to tourists, 43% of
the patrons were downtown office employees, 42% were
residents living within a four mile radius of the site and 11%
were suburbanites. (96) This was an unusually narrow customer
base. As a result, the tenant mix that had worked so well in
Baltimore and Boston was not suited for Richmond. Once the
office employees went home the marketplace was virtually
empty.
AN EXPENSIVE, INEFFICIENT, AND INFLEXIBLE BUILDING
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The construction of a bridge over Broad Street was a
noble gesture. It held great political and social meaning for
the citizens of Richmond. However, the result of this gesture
was an inefficient, and inflexible building unable to adjust
its tenant mix to meet the needs of its customers.
Rouse sought to build each festival marketplace with
equivalent design and construction standards. However, 6th
Street presented special problems. In their desire to get
this project underway as quickly as possible, Renaissance and
EDC ran into some unforseen problems that may have been
avoided with a more thorough examination of the plans and
exiting conditions.
Leonard Richards, EDC's development director, recalled
that construction of the project was a complex task. Not
only did they have to bridge a major thoroughfare at a safe
elevation, but they also had to tie into existing buildings.
Moreover, the Miller Rhoads store was composed of three
different buildings each at different elevations. To resolve
this Enterprise had to raise floors within the department
store. Soil conditions along the street bed required
additional foundation columns. The age of the department
store buildings required costly manual demolition to protect
their structural integrity when bearing walls were removed to
construct Palm Court. The heating and ventilation system in
Miller Rhoads was so antiquated that air pressure between the
buildings could not achieve equilibrium. This caused the
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heat to be sucked out of the marketplace. In order to meet
the rehab standards of the National Historic Trust, the roof
of the Crystal Palace had to be constructed in glass instead
of a more energy efficient metal system. {97} These
conditions resulted in a very expensive project. The 6th
Street Marketplace cost twice as much as Norfolk's Waterside -
a building of comparable size. {98}
Waterside 6th Street
Gross Bldg Area 130,000 120,000
Costruction Cost $8,300,000 $18,100,000
Per Square Foot $63.85 $150.83
Higher development costs meant that the marketplace had to
generate higher rental income. However, the ability to achieve
a profitable rent was limited by an inefficient building.
Festival retailing requires large common areas to create
a visually entertaining setting and serve the volume of
patrons. Therefore, they are less efficient than traditional
shopping centers. The gross leasable area (GLA) of an
enclosed shopping mall normally equals 84 to 89 percent of the
gross building area. {99} The ratio of GLA to gross
building area at Waterside in Norfolk is 61%. {100} The
average ratio for festival markets is 65%. (101) With 120,000
square feet of gross building area and only 67,000 square feet
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of GLA, 6th Street's efficiency ratio was just 55%.
Since unleased space could not generate revenue, the
marketplace had to generate high rents to break even. A
budget analysis prepared by Goodman Segar Hogan projected
1988-89 operating expenses (without debt service) to be $3.3
million or approximately $49 per leasable square foot. {102)
The average rents ranged between $30 and $35 per square foot.
{103} Even if the market were fully leased, and all the
tenants were paying reasonable rents, this marketplace could
not produce sufficient revenues to cover expenses.
Project Architect Michael Garz felt that highlighting
the total building efficiency told only part of the story. An
additional problem was fitting retail businesses within the
narrow space provided. In siting the marketplace between
existing buildings, shops were squeezed into spaces with
depths of 25 feet or less. (104) The average depth of stores
in a regional mall is 100 to 110 feet. (105} Shops of small
tenants in neighborhood centers are generally 60 to 100 feet
deep. {106} The narrow spaces provided at 6th Street were
best suited for small specialty retailers or food vendors.
The contribution of space by the department stores
allowed Palm Court to offer more traditional depths. However,
the load bearing beams and floors within the department stores
restricted the size of available shops. The compact spaces
made available by the market's elongated configuration averaged
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around 1,200 square feet for specialty shops and 450 square
feet for food vendors. This was typical of the spaces
provided at Faneuil Hall and Harborplace. {107} However,
those facilities served a substantial tourist base. Efforts
to adjust the tenant mix to include destination retailers for
the dominant office patronage at 6th Street were hampered by
the market's narrow and inflexible configuration. Mr.
Richards recalled that national chains such as The Limited
desired 4,000 to 5,000 square feet of useable space. Only one
retail space in the entire market was that size, and it was
taken by another national chain, Paul Harris. Richards
further recalled that EDC had recruited Walden Books only to
find that the ceiling heights were too low to accommodate
them. {108}
The configuration of the marketplace also affected the
operating costs. The need to retain pedestrian access through
the marketplace from the Performing Arts Center to the
Marriott Hotel and Coliseum essentially made the hallway a
public street. While the stores were open from 10:00am to
6:00pm, the hallway opened at 7:00am and remained open until
the restaurants closed. This could be until 11:00pm on
weekdays or 1:00am on weekends. These extended hours required
the presence of security staff and kept the heating and
lighting systems operating even when the stores were closed.
Kim Hamel, Goodman Seagar Hogan's Director of Retail
Management, stated that these components of the operating
costs were equal to that of a one million square foot mall.
50
(109) Mr. Barron stated that EDC had tried to get the city to
assume the "public cost" of the marketplace, those costs
attributable to keeping the public walkway open. {110}
However, the city did not share their perspective on sharing
these expenses. Tenant rents had to absorb the costs of this
public benefit even if they could not financially benefit from
evening visitors.
MISUNDERSTOOD TOOL
In supporting the development of 6th Street the city had
several objectives. They sought to retain the department
stores and reestablish the Broad and Grace Street retail
district as a fully competitive, quality shopping area. They
desired to upgrade the stores along Broad Street and enhance
Grace Street's position as a center for specialty shopping.
They also wished to maintain and enhance downtown's position
as an eating, drinking, and entertainment area. (111) At
first glance, the marketplace supported this strategy.
However, the project was actually being viewed from different
perspectives. The city was expecting a new shopping
destination while the developer was building an attraction.
Given the desire to reestablish Broad and Grace Streets
as a quality shopping area, the idea of using the existing
department stores as anchors for additional retail
destinations was an appropriate strategy. It built upon the
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existing shopping generators and followed the time tested
model of suburban shopping centers. However, Enterprise was
not constructing a shopping center. They were creating an
attraction. The stores within were meant to be "enjoyable
places" rather than retail destinations. Although Palm Court
provided specialty shops to complement the department
stores, the addition of kiosks and pushcart vendors selling
"frivolous merchandise" confused the image of 6th Street.
Serious shoppers found the goods to be too trendy or too
expensive for the quality offered.
The merchants shared the city's misunderstanding of the
nature of a festival marketplace. One merchant who sold
leather briefcases commented that it was hard to carry on
serious business when the marketplace became too festive.
People came into the store, but they didn't buy anything.
{112) Such customer behavior was commonplace in a festival
market, but not in a regional mall.
The differing perceptions held by the merchants and the
developer were expressed in disputes over the focus of
advertising and promotions. Since the marketplace was an
attraction and not a retail destination, Enterprise placed
great emphasis on marketing the festive setting. This
approach, depended on downtown promotions and special events
to reinforce this festive atmosphere. Mr. Barron complained
that Richmond's downtown promotions office was underfunded,
forcing Enterprise to dilute their advertising budget to
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support special events. The merchants, on the other hand,
complained that Enterprise concentrated on special events and
spent too little on advertising. (113)
Each perspective was appropriate for the type of
facility envisioned. To Enterprise, an attraction needed to
be promoted as a pleasant place to visit, eat and shop. To
the merchants, a shopping center needed to advertise the goods
and prices of the retail destinations within. These divergent
views contributed to strained relations and the inability to
agree on a common marketing strategy. The marketing approach
employed by Goodman Segar Hogan placed a greater emphasis on
increasing consumer awareness of the center's retail
destinations and was more in keeping with the merchants'
expectations. {114}
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC BARRIERS
Just as the tenant mix within the market confused the
serious shopper, the character of the Broad and Grace Street
retail district further thwarted efforts to attract intown and
suburban customers. The downtown retail district catered to
two consumer markets. The stores along Grace Street provided
medium to higher priced men's and women's apparel in popular
stores such as Ardley, Berry Burk and Whitney's. These were
located across from Miller & Rhoads between 6th and 5th
Streets. The stores along Broad Street offered a mix of
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discount apparel and shoe stores, fast food restaurants, drug
stores, and dry cleaning and hair care services. Though the
department stores offered medium to higher priced products,
the discount character that extended from 2nd to 8th Street
truly set the tone for the district. Middle to upper income
comparison shoppers were unlikely to find the goods they
sought either in the marketplace or on Broad Street.
Moreover, despite efforts to bridge the black and white
communities, the affects of racial segregation were still
evident. Broad Street had essentially become the black
regional shopping district for nearby Jackson Ward.{Figure 41
This presented a psychological barrier to both shoppers and
merchants. Nancy Jones recalled that some local white
merchants would not lease in 6th Street because of its
location. The city's emphasis on recruiting minority
businesses also gave the impression of this being a black
shopping center. {115} The marketplace could not overcome
this discount store setting or the psychological barriers
presented by this site.
The city's efforts could not change the habits of
suburban shoppers. Their tastes were better served by
existing regional centers. Nor would existing stores upgrade
their merchandise for customers that were not coming downtown.
Ms. Jones noted that it was harder to lease 6th Street after
it had opened. Some retailers felt that little had changed.
{116} The magnitude of change generated by the marketplace
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was simply not enough to make a difference.
AMENITY DEFICIENT SITE
By insisting on a site that would reinforce the
historical retail district, Rouse allowed his civic interest
to permit him to overlook a crucial element of festival
retailing. The marketplace must be located where people are
coming or want to come just for the sake of being there. If
people are coming to a place for the ambiance of the area the
experience must be something that outlives the novelty. The
need for a high amenity location was ignored.
The area most compatible with this desired character
was Grace Street. The two-lane, one-way street supported a
lighter traffic volume then Broad. Its benches and mature
shade trees offered a pleasant, human-scale, pedestrian path
to the department stores and specialty apparel shops.
However, the market's interface with Grace was minimal.
Direct access to the market could only be achieved by
walking around to a side entrance.
The project's front door, Broad Street, presented a more
utilitarian demeanor. On the south side, the forboding black
steel facade of the Thalheimer building was softened by the
display windows at ground level. The more traditional facade
of Miller & Rhoads was more pleasing but did nothing to
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animate the street. On the north side, the Marriott Hotel
pulled back from Broad, placing its entrance on 5th Street. A
landscaped buffer along the pedestrian path blocked any view
of the hotel lobby or dining area just beyond the hedges. No
attempt was made to connect the hotel to the market. Although
the Project One office building was physically connected to
the market at ground level, the shared access was hardly
noticeable.
Three vacant theaters were located on Broad between 7th
and 8th. Mr. Berry stated that Historic Richmond Inc. planned
to rehabilitate these structures, but no concrete proposals
had emerged. (117) The remainder of this block was composed
of fast food restaurants and discount stores.
Broad Street was a six-lane vehicular artery
stretching from downtown to the western suburbs. The city
landscaped the median strip and planted street trees to soften
the impact of the heavy traffic. But the planting was too
recent to provide shade to passengers waiting in the hot
summer sun for the trolley or local bus. Streetscape
improvements such as banners, benches, bus shelters, and shop
directory kiosks that could have given the retail district a
distinct identity were lacking. Mr. Barron stated that the
marketplace was designed to create a "pleasant walk along a
city street." However, unique architecture alone could not
produce this effect. {118)
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The primary public space was provided by Festival Park.
The park features a life size statue of a Blue's Army
infantryman. A small fountain, a pavilion and classic
lighting fixtures each echoed the architectural theme of the
marketplace. Concerts and special events were accommodated by
a bandstand rented by Downtown Presents. However, the
Festival Park was located in the rear of the project. With
the marketplace stretched out over three blocks, even a well
attended concert did not generate customers for the shops in
Palm Court or Renaissance Court.
INADEQUATE ATTRACTION SUPPORT STRUCTURE
Festival markets are intended to augment other
attractions nearby, to create a synergy of events and a
complementary atmosphere for people to enjoy. They cannot
stand alone. The closest attraction to the Richmond site was
the Virginia Performing Arts Center. The Coliseum and the
Convention Centre were services whose entertainment value
depended on the event occurring inside. The two historical
museums were four and five blocks away, as was the State
Capital complex. The attraction support structure for the
marketplace was not present.
Moreover, this support structure should have predated
the marketplace. Successful projects in Baltimore and Norfolk
were built at the sites of other festivals or citywide events.
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The annual City Fair in Baltimore brought people to the
waterfront some 10 years before Harborplace. In Norfolk the
city had also begun to draw people back to their waterfront
along the Elizabeth River. The arrival of the tall ships
during the 1976 Bicentennial had turned into an annual event
drawing a million people. {119) In Richmond the idea of
coming to Broad Street for recreation had not been fostered
since the street fairs of the 1920's. (120) An entire
generation was not accustomed to identifying this location
with recreation.
COMPETING DISTRICTS
As noted, Richmond's economic health was sound. The
downtown office district and nearby Shockoe Slip had seen
significant private development over a 15 to 20 year period.
(121) By locating the market within the Broad and Grace
Street retail district the city made a deliberate decision to
bolster an area that was not attracting private development.
This was an appropriate role for city government. However,
market forces were creating a competing shopping and
entertainment district in the Shockoe Slip area. The amenity
package and easy access offered by this alternative location
placed 6th Street at a disadvantage.
Shockoe Slip was the site of the city's first
settlements. {Figure 4} Up until the early 20th century the
58
area was a very active warehouse and commercial district.
After several decades of decline, the area began to attract a
cluster of restaurants, night clubs and specialty shops. Its
designation as a National Historic District in 1981 spurred
further development. Offices and apartments began to mix with
the warehouses still in operation. {122} By 1982 the
district contained a dozen restaurants and half a dozen retail
stores comprising 80,000 to 90,000 square feet of commercial
space. {123} Cobblestone streets and brick sidewalks
complemented the historic architecture. Plaques on several
buildings provided a history of the tobacco and shipping
industry which spawned the original development of the area.
Such elements enhanced its potential as a tourist attraction.
The proximity of the James River provided a natural amenity.
The office and financial district was located just west
of Shockoe Slip. Between 1973 and 1982 the city added 3.3
million square feet of office space primarily within this
area. {124} Proximity to the office district provided a
ready customer base. In 1982, soon after the formation of
Richmond Renaissance, Faison Associates and CSX Resources (the
Chessie Railroad System) announced that they would build a 3
million square foot mixed-used project called James Center at
the western edge of Shockoe Slip. {125} At the time that 6th
Street was planned office and commercial development was
clearly shifting south and west of the 6th Street area. The
marketplace was moving against the tide.
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Conventional wisdom would suggest that competition
between these districts would be beneficial. The synergy of
attractions would bring a greater volume of shoppers to the
area. However, competition can also produce winners and
losers. Synergy is partly a by-product of the proximity of
attractions to one another and the ease of access between
them. Shockoe Slip was six blocks from the 6th Street
Marketplace and down a very steep hill. Office employees were
reluctant to make this hike on a hot summer day. Linking
these areas by trolley greatly offset this disadvantage.
However, synergy also depends on the areas being equally
desirable.
As noted earlier, there were economic and
psychological barriers to visiting the Broad Street commercial
district. Shockoe Slip offered a greater amenity package.
Its historic setting and architecture along with its proximity
to the river more readily attracted developers and retailers
to this area. Mr. Richards recalled recruiting a regional
men's apparel store to leased space at 6th Street who upon
visiting the city chose instead to locate in Shockoe Slip.
{126} To office workers Shockoe Slip offered ready access to
similar goods and services to those being provided at 6th
Street. Despite the city's efforts to tie these areas
together, Shockoe Slip competed with 6th Street for food,
entertainment and specialty store customers.
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UNDERCAPITALIZED DEVELOPER
The entry of Enterprise into the festival marketplace
arena brought about a significant change in the nature of the
private/public partnerships that spawned the earlier projects.
The Rouse Company had always sought city assistance in
acquiring the land and writing down the cost in the form of a
long term lease. They acted as owner and manager and used
their substantial portfolio of projects to recruit retailers
and financial support. Enterprise on the other hand, had only
one million dollars in capital when it started and no track
record to establish investor confidence. {127} They needed
city assistance not only in land assemblage but also in
obtaining financing. Enterprise offered cities their
development and management expertise in return for a
development fee and a share in the profits. The cities shared
the profits but also shared the risks. Enterprise projects
took on the character of a public institution. The roles of
the city and the developer became blurred.
In Richmond, EDC's need to depend on the city's
financial resources led city officials to assume a more direct
role in the management of the marketplace. Mr. Barron noted
how intensely political the situation became. If they were
trying to press a delinquent tenant for back rent, they would
get calls for city councilman pressuring them to back off.
If a merchant was displeased with a particular promotional
event, they would get calls from city hall. He had expected
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a good deal of city involvement in the planning and
construction of 6th Street, but he thought that management
policies and practices would be left in EDC's domain. In his
opinion "you can't run a mall from city hall." (128}
On the other hand, the city's prestige and money were at
stake. The marketplace was a symbol of the city's ability to
revitalize downtown. As the major initiative of a black
administration, the failure of the marketplace would have
detrimental political repercussions that could outweigh the
economic loss. With each new request for additional funds the
city saw a developer with little financial stake in the
project squandering the public's investment. As the city's
perceived political and financial risk increased, they could
not sit back and watch. The extended duration of public
financial involvement had recast the marketplace as a public
institution. The participants did not recognize that they
were working with a new model of public/private partnerships
in which the public interest was dominant. The strains that
developed between the developer and the city over tenant mix,
marketing and management issues reflected problems in working
out new roles in a new context that had not previously been
defined.
Great Expectations
The 6th Street Marketplace was burdened by great
expectations. When the city and the merchants became
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disillusioned with Enterprise, it was almost impossible for
the developer to change their opinions. The news media
projected a negative image from which the marketplace could
not rebound. What was festive about law suits and failing
businesses? How could visitors expect a positive experience
from complaining merchants? The marketplace could not attract
new merchants or customers in such a negative environment.
Robert Olsen, who succeeded Evans as Executive Director of
Richmond Renaissance, observed this shift in attitudes.
Part of the problem was that it was over-hyped
from the beginning. It would have been very
difficult for 6th Street to live up to the frenzy
of attention this thing got when it opened. The
wonder and celebration of 6th Street Marketplace
was a story for two years. Then there was nothing
more to say. When the heating problems started,
when the first tenant law suits were filed, when
the chink in the armor was found, the press really
jumped on it. Then the story became the problems.
{129}
By 1987 Enterprise clearly knew that 6th Street did not
fit into their standard formula for festival retailing. {130}
The decision to change to a specialty shopping center could
well have been implemented by Enterprise. However the
confidence in Enterprise had fallen to such depths that only a
change in management could hope to rekindle a positive image
for the marketplace.
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Part IV
WAS THE MARKETPLACE BENEFICIAL
If success is defined as a project that earns a profit,
has few vacancies, has a high level of shopping activity and
has happy tenants, then the 6th Street Marketplace was
certainly a failure. However, the city of Richmond received
several tangible benefits from the marketplace.
The 6th Street Marketplace gave life and purpose to
Richmond Renaissance. In a city that had been torn apart, the
cooperation between the white business community and black
political leaders established a much needed bond. In many
ways the efforts of Richmond Renaissance offer a fine example
of how private/public partnerships can implement downtown
development. From the moment the idea of the marketplace was
conceived Mr. Evans and his staff acted as the catalyst for
the project. They produced the feasibility study, prepared
and negotiated the UDAG application, negotiated the letters of
intent, and through the auspices of their board obtained debt
and equity financing. Their participation in the leasing
efforts helped recruit local merchants and win broad community
acceptance. The use of a quasi-public sponsor to expedite
the development process demonstrated what could be achieved
with cooperation between the business community and city
government. The development of 6th Street set the stage for
future collaboration.
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There is no doubt that 6th Street strengthened the
retail district. A derelict three block section of downtown
was improved. The stores recruited to the marketplace were of
a higher quality than found in most of the district.
However, the development of the marketplace did not prevent
some attrition. Whitney's, and Montaldo's, two higher priced
apparel stores moved from Grace Street, and a few vacant
storefronts appeared. (1311 However, if the marketplace had
not been built, the losses might have been greater.
Thanks to this project, the city was able to negotiate a
commitment from both Thalhimers and Miller & Rhoads to
continue operating at this location for ten years from the
opening of 6th Street. {132} Moreover, the department stores
undertook over $4.2 million in renovations to bolster their
commitment. {133} The marketplace spurred an additional $13.5
million in private and public investment. The renovation of a
250-room Days Inn on 6th and Marshall ($6.5 million), the
construction of the new 800-space Renaissance parking garage
($4.5 million) and the renovation of the 600-space garage by
the Redevelopment & Housing Authority ($2.5 million) were a
direct result of the development of 6th Street. {134) In
addition, the project has generated approximately $775,000 in
new property, income and employment taxes annually. (135}
The minority business training program and the screening
of job applicants insured that an important social objective
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was achieved. One third of the tenants present on opening day
were graduates of this program. Half of the permanent
employees hired were black. And half of the construction
contracts went to minority firms. {136)
Robert Olsen, who succeeded Evans as Executive Director
of Richmond Renaissance, felt that the benefits of the
marketplace were not appreciated.
The 6th Street Marketplace is a smashing success
for a bunch of reasons. It kept the department
stores downtown. It helped the image of the city.
It's a three block public street that connects a
number of things that needed to be connected.
It's a downtown meeting place. Many people, and I
believe rightfully, guestion why this project must
be coldly Judged on its real estate economics when
it's providing such great public benefits. In
many respects it should be seen as a loss leader
or a public amenity. {137}
This view was tempered however by the continuing drain
the project has placed on the city's budget. The city
allocated $4 million in both 1988 and 1989 to make physical
alterations to the project and to keep 6th Street operating.
It is anticipated that $2.5-$3 million in annual
appropriations will be needed for several years to come. Mr.
Berry commented that it would be difficult to sustain this
level of financial support.
The project is becoming less popular and more
divisive in the community. People are tired of
putting money into it. They want the money spent
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in their neighborhoods. There's going to have to
be a turn around. We can't keep putting $4
million a year into this thing. We've got to get
it to appear to be more of a success in the eyes
of the citizens, or they're going to say turn the
lights out. {138}
PART V
EXPERIENCE GAINED
The poor performance of the 6th Street Marketplace
demonstrates the need for a large regional population base.
If a festival market must be supported by only 30% of the
people visiting the facility, a large indigenous base is a
reasonable requirement. However a rigid reliance on numbers
alone could lead to the same proportionate scaling of a
project that led to the failure of 6th Street. Even a one
million population does not guarantee that you will have a
large enough affluent population willing to purchase frivolous
merchandise. Nor does this figure consider the accessibility
of the site and the possible competition from other sites.
An application of a gravity model of consumer choice would be
a valuable test to confirm this assumption. However, the
equally dismal performance of festival markets in Toledo and
Flint suggests that some threshold has been crossed, and a
rule-of-thumb of one million reflects the wisdom of that
experience.
The critical mass of 80,000 square feet is again
supported by the fact that no marketplace smaller than this
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has been successful. I would suggest however, that plans for
future markets consider the components of this theory. What
level of per person expenditures are needed to support the
marketplace and how long must the attractions offered hold
these customers to reach that expenditure level. I would also
consider whether the tenant mix offers a diversity of
experiences to attract return visits.
Richmond also demonstrates the need for a pre-existing
tourist base. The size of that base could not be determined
from a single case study. A comparison of other markets may
provide further understanding of the tourist expenditures
needed to support festival markets. In the absence of a
threshold figure, an examination of the tourist expenditures
of each municipality and a field visit to the attractions
available within the target market would be appropriate.
The Richmond experience provides an opportunity to
further understand the nature of festival marketplaces. Even
though the facility was nestled between two department stores,
it retained a distinctly different character. The marketplace
could not thrive in the same physical setting that supported
the anchor stores; it could not generate adequate revenues
from the same customer base, nor could its unique tenant mix
of food and impulse goods expand the customer base of the
retail district. Festival markets are not shopping centers.
They are first and foremost attractions. They are more
closely related to entertainment centers or amusement parks
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than to regional malls. Their customers are attracted by the
entertainment value of the setting as well as the novel
merchandise within the market. An understanding of these
differences will give city officials and developers a better
understanding of how and where to use this redevelopment tool.
Before rushing off to build a festival marketplace, city
planners should consider the nature of the problem they are
trying to solve. In Richmond, a fashion-oriented specialty
shopping center placed between the department stores and
combined with extensive upgrading of the Broad Street corridor
might have proved more compatible with their objectives. On
the other hand, if their goal was to augment existing
attractions and provide a greater diversity of recreational
experiences downtown, the festival marketplace would be a more
appropriate choice.
Planners should also make an assessment of the current
retailing and entertainment situation. Are there existing
districts that have an attractive setting and ambiance that
people are already visiting? They should build on the
existing base of attractions and consider what actions could
be taken to enhance the enjoyment of these places. It may not
be necessary to build an artificial setting to substitute for
what is already occurring naturally. City officials in
Richmond could have enhanced the commercial and entertainment
value of Shockoe Slip by providing more parking, building a
pedestrian link to the James River and coordinating joint
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marketing for the existing shops. These steps would have been
less expensive than 6th Street Marketplace and might have
produced similar long term benefits.
The need for a high amenity location cannot be
ignored. The site must offer a variety of attractions and
pleasant experiences to attract visitors who simply want to
enjoy the setting. This is clearly the life support system of
a festival marketplace. Waterfront locations or historic
districts do not guarantee success, but they may offer
established pedestrian oriented settings not found in
downtowns dominated by office and commercial buildings. The
Richmond experience shows that, in isolation, an
architecturally attractive building with limited pedestrian
open space cannot create a festive mood.
Psychological barriers associated with certain downtown
locations should also be identified. Surveys of the target
population of potential customers could identify how people
feel about shopping or visiting downtown and what changes
would increase the frequency of their forays into downtown.
The 6th Street experience also points out the need to protect
the festive image of the marketplace over time. Like other
attractions a negative reputation can adversely affect
festival markets.
The selection of project sites and building
configurations should be made on the basis of business goals.
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Developers and city planners should not be so captured by a
grand idea that they ignore the practical business needs of
the marketplace. The revitalization of a depressed retail
district and the symbolic linking of the black and white
community were noble goals. But if achieving them places the
economic viability of a project at risk, they should not drive
the decision to build any commercial project.
Developers and planners must recognize that festival
marketplaces are businesses where goods are sold.
Therefore, the rules of retailing still apply. Festival
markets have to adjust to the needs and desires of their
customers. The building and shop configurations should be
flexible enough to make these adjustments. Like all
commercial real estate projects, unleased space cannot pay the
development and operating costs. Buildings should be designed
to capture as much leasable floor area as possible. High
construction costs translate into high rents and often the
cost of downtown projects exceed the rents that can be
obtained. Negotiating favorable financing terms can
ameliorate this problem, but it should not substitute for
careful planning and efficient design.
The nature of the private/public partnership practiced
by Enterprise suggests that there might be two models for
developing a festival marketplace - one sponsored by the
private sector and one developed by the public sector. The
Rouse Company had sought public assistance to provide land
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acquisition and site improvements for their urban projects.
But they did not require ongoing public subsidies to operate
these facilities. Since Enterprise did not have capital to
invest in the development of the markets, they offered to act
as development consultant and the managing general partner for
a fee and a share in the profits. As the marketplace became
more dependent on public funds, the city began to perceive
the market as a public facility. When Enterprise left, the
contract with Goodman Segar Hogan to manage but not own the
marketplace reflected this changed relationship.
Since the cost of land assemblage and site preparation
is often too expensive for downtown projects to bear, public
financial assistance will continue to be an essential part of
downtown development. If the need for public involvement is
limited to predevelopment activities or to secondary
financing, then it is appropriate for the private sector to
retain ownership and have a free hand in operating the
project. However, if the city's financial presence is needed
on a continuing basis, the project will be perceived as a
public facility. The operating budget, marketing and
management policies would more naturally reside in government
hands. If the expertise of a private developer is desired,
one could be hired as a consultant or manager.
In the future some cities may choose to take on the role
of developer from the start. A city could then choose to
promote entertainment or shopping opportunities downtown even
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if the population or tourist base were not adequate. They
would be more capable of shouldering the long term financial
burden than a private developer. The financial obligations
could be estimated and committed up front and not enter the
budget through the back door. This would not mean that cities
would not seek out developers, but their roles would be clear
from the start. As a developer the city could chose to foster
social and political goals that may not be compatible with the
private developer's profit motives and finite resources.
PART VI
CONCLUSION
The study of 6th Street Marketplace offers a better
understanding of the nature of a festival marketplace. It
also provide insights into the possible roles the developer
and city officials may play in public/private partnerships.
While a list of do's and dont's can be derived from this
experience, it would be a mistake to draw general conclusions.
Each marketplace presents a different social, physical and
economic context. An examination of the problems experienced
in Richmond could flag potential problems that similar
projects will confront in the future.
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with an
Ice Cream
palor asits
central
occupant.
The narrow
pedestrian
hallway of
Renaissance
Plaza.
75
Crystal
Palace
attached
to the
rehabilitated
Blues
Armory.
The Food
Court
within the
Crystal
Palace.
Food
vendors
are
located
within the
Palace and
in the
Blues
Armory.
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Festival
Park
during
"Friday
Night
Cheers"
party
produced
Mby
Downtown
Presents.
Grace
Street
facade of
the
market.
The
Performing
Arts
Center is
located on
the right.
The market
entrance
is between
these
buildings.
77
Grace
Street
shops -
location
of higher
price
men's and
women' s
apparel
stores.
The Broad
Street
corridor
offered
discount
stores
which set
the tone
for the
district.
78
Three
vacant
theaters
also set
the tone
for Broad
Street.
The
Project
One office
building
is in the
background.
The
trolley
connected
Shokhoe
Slip and
the office
district
with the
marketplace.
The side
panel is
advertising
the food
services
at 6th
Street.
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